SOC 2 Evidence Package

What Your SOC 2 Auditor
Actually Receives

Every ThetaZero agent execution maps to AICPA Trust Service Criteria automatically. This is the evidence package your Type II auditor sees — control ID, description, artifact, status.

See how this maps to your workflows → View Generic Evidence

SAMPLE — Demonstration Only · All data is fictional · Safe to share with auditors

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SOC 2 Type II — What Auditors Need to See

AICPA Trust Service Criteria · Security, Availability, Confidentiality

SOC 2 Type II requires operational evidence — not just policy documents. Your auditor wants proof that controls are operating effectively over time: who accessed what, when, under what authorization, and whether anyone detected policy violations.

ThetaZero produces this evidence automatically on every governed agent run. The package below shows a Privileged Access Review Agent execution — the scenario most SOC 2 auditors focus on for CC6.1 and CC8.1. Every data access is logged, permission-checked, TEE-attested, and mapped to a control ID.

TSC Controls Covered

TEE-Attested Audit Records

Policy Violations Detected

100%

Audit Coverage

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Section 1 — Agent Execution Report

SAMPLE

Agent Name

Privileged Access Review

Agent Purpose

Reviews privileged account changes, validates authorization, and produces SOC 2 evidence

Execution ID

TZ-EXEC-20260411-007304

Timestamp (UTC)

2026-04-11T09:14:02.338Z

Status

COMPLETED

Duration / Tokens

6,211 ms · 3,104 tokens

Model Version

claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219

Compute Source

TZ-EC-9b2a4c · us-east-1

TEE Attestation

HMAC-SHA256 Signed

Input Task / Prompt

Review all privileged account changes in the Apr 1–11 2026 window for Meridian Health Systems. Identify: (1) new admin/superuser accounts created, (2) permission escalations, (3) accounts not deprovisioned within SLA after employee departure. Cross-check each change against the change management log (ServiceNow). Flag any unauthorized modifications. Produce SOC 2 CC6.1 / CC7.2 / CC8.1 evidence artifacts.

Execution Log

Execution Trace · 11 actions · 0 policy violations

TZ-EXEC-20260411-007304

09:14:02.338INFOExecution initialized · agent=privileged-access-review · model=claude-3-7-sonnet-20250219

09:14:02.491ACTIONREAD iam_audit_log · scope=admin_account_changes · period=2026-04-01/2026-04-11 · input_hash=b7c1d4f8…

09:14:02.814CHECKPermission granted: iam_audit_log.read · credential=svc-access-review · ✓ authorized

09:14:03.271ACTIONQUERY iam_audit_log · 4 admin account changes found in period · output_hash=3a5c7e9b…

09:14:03.590ACTIONREAD change_mgmt_log (ServiceNow) · cross-referencing 4 changes against CHG records

09:14:04.128CHECKCHG-2026-04182 → admin_create:j.walsh · ✓ AUTHORIZED — CHG approved 2026-04-02, manager=c.okonkwo

09:14:04.562CHECKCHG-2026-04291 → priv_escalation:svc-etl-prod · ✓ AUTHORIZED — CHG approved 2026-04-07, manager=d.reyes

09:14:05.037CHECKCHG-2026-04388 → admin_create:m.tanaka · ✓ AUTHORIZED — CHG approved 2026-04-09, manager=c.okonkwo

09:14:05.481CHECKDeprovision SLA check · departed_users=2 · deprovisioned_within_24h=2 · ✓ SLA MET

09:14:05.914ACTIONWRITE soc2_evidence_log · record_type=access_review · policy_violations=0 · tee_attested=true

09:14:06.549DONEExecution complete · 4 changes reviewed · ALL AUTHORIZED · 0 violations · evidence written

✓ Agent Determination

ALL CLEAR — 4 privileged access changes reviewed. All 4 cross-matched against approved change tickets. Deprovision SLA met for both departures (within 24h). No unauthorized modifications detected. Permission boundary enforced throughout: 4 allowed scopes accessed, 3 sensitive scopes blocked per policy. Evidence artifact written to SOC 2 evidence log. CC6.1, CC7.2, and CC8.1 controls supported.

Permission Boundary (Enforced at Runtime)

✓ Allowed Scopes (4)

✓ iam_audit_log.read

✓ change_mgmt_log.read

✓ hr_termination_log.read

✓ soc2_evidence_log.write

✗ Blocked Scopes (3)

✗ iam.write (read-only agent)

✗ user_credentials.read

✗ production_db.write

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Section 2 — SOC 2 Control Mapping

SAMPLE

Below is the control mapping your SOC 2 auditor receives — automatically generated from this agent execution. Each row maps a Trust Service Criteria control ID to the evidence artifact produced in this run.

Control ID	Control Description	Evidence Type	Evidence Artifact	Status
CC6.1	Logical Access Controls The entity implements logical access security software, infrastructure, and architectures to protect against threats from unauthorized access.	execution_artifact	Permission boundary enforced at runtime — 4 allowed scopes, 3 blocked. All accesses logged in `audit_trail.json` with input/output hashes and TEE attestation.	✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED
CC6.2	User Registration & Authorization Prior to issuing system credentials, the entity registers and authorizes new internal and external users whose access is administered by the entity.	execution_artifact	Each admin account creation in the review period was cross-matched against an approved ServiceNow CHG ticket with named approver. All 4 changes confirmed authorized.	✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED
CC6.6	Logical Access — External Access The entity implements controls to prevent or detect and act upon logical access from outside its boundaries that could threaten the achievement of objectives.	policy_document	External access policy documented in Trust Pack §4. Agent credential (`svc-access-review`) uses scoped service token — no direct user credential access. Boundary enforced in TEE.	◎ MAPPED
CC7.1	Vulnerability & Infrastructure Detection To meet its objectives, the entity uses detection and monitoring procedures to identify changes to configurations that introduce new vulnerabilities.	execution_artifact	0 policy violations detected in this execution. Violation count tracked per run and queryable. Anomalous permission requests blocked and logged automatically.	✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED
CC7.2	System Monitoring The entity monitors system components and the operation of those components for anomalies that indicate malicious acts, natural disasters, and errors affecting the entity's ability to meet its objectives.	execution_artifact	All 8 audit events logged with TEE attestation. SHA-256 hashes computed at time of recording within TEE — cannot be retroactively modified. Deprovision SLA monitored and confirmed met.	✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED
CC8.1	Change Management The entity authorizes, designs, develops or acquires, configures, documents, tests, approves, and implements changes to infrastructure, data, software, and procedures to meet its change management commitments and requirements.	execution_artifact	4 privileged access changes validated against ServiceNow change tickets. Each change mapped: CHG ticket ID → approver → timestamp → IAM log entry. Full chain documented in `audit_trail.json`.	✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED
CC9.2	Vendor Risk Management The entity assesses and monitors risks associated with vendors and business partners.	policy_document	Third-party vendor access policy documented in Trust Pack §6. Agent only accesses vendor-managed systems via scoped read-only credentials. No write access to vendor systems permitted.	◑ DOCUMENTED

✓ EVIDENCE GENERATED Artifact produced in this specific execution run

◎ MAPPED Control addressed by platform configuration or Trust Pack policy

◑ DOCUMENTED Control documented in policy — not observable in single execution

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Section 3 — Cryptographic Audit Trail

SAMPLE

Every API call, data access, and output produced during execution is logged here with SHA-256 input/output hashes and a TEE attestation ID. Hashes are computed within the Trusted Execution Environment at time of recording — they cannot be retroactively modified.

09:14:02.491

READ · iam_audit_log/admin_account_changes

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: iam_audit_log.read · Records returned: 4
input_hash: b7c1d4f8e2a0b3c5d7e9f1a3b5c7d9e1f3a5b7c9 · output_hash: 3a5c7e9b1d3f5a7c9e1b3d5f7a9c1e3b5d7f9a1b

TEE ✓ AUD-90201

09:14:03.590

READ · change_mgmt_log (ServiceNow) — CHG-2026-04182

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: change_mgmt_log.read · Change: admin_create:j.walsh · Authorized by: c.okonkwo
output_hash: 9c1e3b5d7f9a1b3d5f7a9c1e3b5d7f9a1b3d5f7a · record_hash: d4f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2

TEE ✓ AUD-90202

09:14:04.562

READ · change_mgmt_log (ServiceNow) — CHG-2026-04291

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: change_mgmt_log.read · Change: priv_escalation:svc-etl-prod · Authorized by: d.reyes
output_hash: e2f4a6b8c0d2e4f6a8b0c2d4e6f8a0b2c4e6f8a0 · record_hash: f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2d4f6a8b0c2d4

TEE ✓ AUD-90203

09:14:05.037

READ · change_mgmt_log (ServiceNow) — CHG-2026-04388

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: change_mgmt_log.read · Change: admin_create:m.tanaka · Authorized by: c.okonkwo
output_hash: a1b3c5d7e9f1a3b5c7d9e1f3a5b7c9d1e3f5a7b9 · record_hash: b0c2d4e6f8a0b2c4e6f8a0b2c4e6f8a0b2c4e6f8

TEE ✓ AUD-90204

09:14:05.481

READ · hr_termination_log — Deprovision SLA Check

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: hr_termination_log.read · Departures in period: 2 · Deprovisioned ≤24h: 2 · SLA_MET: true
output_hash: c4d6e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2 · record_hash: e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2c4d6e8f0a2c4d6

TEE ✓ AUD-90205

09:14:05.914

WRITE · soc2_evidence_log/access_review_20260411

Credential: svc-access-review · Permission: granted · Scope: soc2_evidence_log.write · policy_violations: 0 · changes_reviewed: 4 · all_authorized: true
output_hash: f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c8d9e0f1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8 · record_hash: a2b4c6d8e0f2a4c6d8e0f2a4c6d8e0f2a4c6d8e0

TEE ✓ AUD-90208

TEE Attestation Summary

          Compute Node: TZ-EC-9b2a4c · us-east-1

          Attestation Method: HMAC-SHA256 platform attestation

          Records Attested: 8 / 8 (100%)

          Policy Violations: 0

          Execution Hash: tz_tee_v1:007304:b7c1d4f8:2026-04-11T09:14:02.338Z

manifest.json — Integrity Checksums

          execution_logs.json · sha256: 7c3f9a1b5d2e8f4a0c6d3b9e5f1a7c2d8e4f0a6c… · 9,182 bytes

          soc2_control_mapping.json · sha256: 4a8b2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e… · 4,021 bytes

          audit_trail.json · sha256: b1c5d9e3f7a0b4c8d2e6f0a4b8c2d6e0f4a8b2c6… · 12,844 bytes

          tee_attestation.json · sha256: e0f4a8b2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e4f8a2c6… · 4,391 bytes

          README.txt · sha256: c8d2e6f0a4b8c2d6e0f4a8b2c6d0e4f8a2c6d0e4… · 1,284 bytes